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NOTES

ON

RECENT
CASES

CONVERSION BY A PLEDGEE.-Whether

MISSOURI

a pledgee who wrongfully

sells or repledges his security in excess of his authority, is liable to his
pledgor in trover without a tender of the debt, is a question on which
the authorities are in conflict. The first adjudication of the question in
England was had in the Court of Common Pleas in the case of Johnson v.
Stear.1 That case allowed a recovery in trover by the pledgor against
the pledgee, who had sold the pledged goods before he had a right to do
so under the pledge, but the majority of the court limited the recovery
to the damage actually suffered-that is, the recovery was diminished
to the extent of the pledgee's interest, on the theory of compensation.
Williams, J., in a separate opinion maintained that the pledgor should
in an action of trover recover the full value of the property pledged.
This case has, in effect, been overruled in England by the later cases
of Donald v. Suckling 2 and Halliday v. Holgate.3 The former was a suit
in the Court of Queen's Bench by the original pledgor against one to whom
the pledgee had repledged the goods for a greater debt of his own, and it
was held that there was no conversion. Halliday v. Holgate was a suit
in the Court of Exchequer against the vendee to whom the pledgee had
1.
2.
3.

(1863) 15 0. 13. (N. S.) 329, 33 L. J. C. P. 130.
(1866) L. R. 1 Q. B. 585.
(1868) L. R. 3 Ex. 299.

(47)
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sold the pledged property before he had a right to do so under the pledge.
It was held that there was no conversion, and this decision was affirmed
in the Court of Exchequer Chamber. The latter court cited Donald v.
Suckling and recognized it as authority for the proposition that there is
no conversion by sale or repledge of pledged property. Cockburn, C.J ,
said in Donald v. Suckling, "We are not dealing with a case of lien, which
is merely the right to retain possession of the chattel, and which right is
immediately lost on the possession being parted with, unless to a person
who may be considered as agent of the party having the lien for purpose
of its custody. In the contract of pledge the pawnor invests the pawnee
with much more than the mere right of possession. He invests him with
a right to deal with the property pledged as his own, if the debt is not
paid and the thing-redeemed at the appointed time." The special property of the pledgee in the property, is considered as continuing in existence until the pledge is redeemed or sold at the time specified.. Mellor,
J., in the same case says that the sale or repledge is simply inoperative as
to the pledgor, and that there must be a tender of the amount for which
the goods were originally pledged to enable the pledgor to maintain trover.
This is the present English law, but the rule is difficult to defend.
The English court itself states that a lien-holder is liable in trover on
parting with the possession of the property. The court then attempts
to justify the ruling as to a pledgee by saying that his powers are more
extensive, and concludes that the sale or repledge does not put an end to
the pledge relation. The amplitude of the powers, it would seem, is beside the point. No matter what his powers are, if he exceeds them, he
should be held as strictly accountable as a lienor.
The various jurisdictions in the United States are not uniform in
their attitudes on this matter. The views taken in Johnson v. Stear and
in Donald v. Suckling and Halliday v. Holgate have each found a following.' Where the acts of the pledgee are held to constitute a conversion,
they may be taken advantage of by the pledgor as the basis of an action
of trover, or of a counterclaim in an action by the pledgee for the debt.'
If the pledgee has made a sale of the pledged property for money, the
pledgor may also sue in assumpsit for money had and received. 6
Having determined that the pledgee is liable in trover, what should
be the amount of the recovery? Some cases hold that the value of the
4. Following tlalliday v. Holgate: Reardon v. Patterson (1897) 19 Mont. 231, 47
Pac. 956; Williams v. Ashe (1896) 111 Cal. 180, 43 Pac. 595; Moffat v. Williams (Col.,
1894) 36 Pac. 914; Tally v. Freedman's Savings and Trust Co. (1876) 93 U. S. 321,
distinguished in Rush v. FirstNat. Bank of Kansas City (1895) 71 Fed. 102, 105, on
ground himself.
that it was
a sfilt against a purchaser from the pledgee and not against
the piedgee
The
distinction

seems doubtfui.
Following Johnson v. Stear: Rosenzweig v. Frazer (1882) 82 Ind. 342; Feige v.
Burl (1898) 118 Mich. 243, 77 N. W. 928; Smith v. avin (1893) 69 Hun, 311,
23N. Y.
Supp. 568; Work v. Bennett (1872) 70 Pa.' St. 484; Waring v. Gaskill (1895) 95 Ga.
731, 5.
22 S.Rush
E. 659.
v. First Nat. Bank of Kansas City (1895) 71 Fed. 102; Bowen
(1859) 9 Wis. 320. and see Villas v. Mason (1870) 25 Wis. 310; Richardson v. Aimsworth v. Ashby (1895) 132 Mo. 238, 33 8. W. 806.
6. Belde v. Perkins (1875) 78 Ill. 449.
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property at the time of the conversion is the proper measure of damages.
But the measure of damages in an action for conversion of property "is,
in the absence of special circumstances, the value of the property or the
property rights converted, at the time of conversion with interest. "
The pledgor, then, should recover the value of his property rights in the
pledge, that is, the value of the property at the time of the conversion,
less the amount of the debt for which it was pledged. This result is
9
reached in most courts, but in different cases it is sometimes based on
different reasoning. It is often stated in the cases that the pledgee when
10
sued for conversion of the pledge may recoup the amount of the debt,
but it is not a strict recoupment. Nor is the reduction of the pledgor's
recovery by the amount of the debt properly explained on the theory
of counterclaim or set-off. The fact is that the pledgee has an interest
in the property to the amount of the debt, and the pledgor's property
right which has been infringed does not include that interest, and the
pledgor's recovery should only be for injury to his property right.",
There are few cases in Missouri on this question. In 1895 in the
1
case of Richardson v. Ashby the Supreme Court held that where the
pledgee repledged the property so as to put in out of his control, the
pledgor had an immediate right to bring an action of trover without
tendering the amount of his indebtedness. In 1901 the St. Louis
Court of Appeals in the case of Schaaf v. Fries's held that a tender was
necessary before the pledgor could bring trover. The latter court said:
"We deem the weight of authority and arguments to be on the side of
the doctrine that the contract of bailment is not extinguished by a wrongful sale, but merely broken; and that the pawnee or his vendee may retain the pawn until the debt is satisfied or satisfaction offered, notwithThe transfer in this case was to the son of the
standing such breach."
pledgee, and the court in its opinion says it was in the power of the pledgee
14
There
to restore. This has been offered as a distinguishing fact.
being a sale it is doubtful whether the possibility of regaining control
7. Robinson v. Hurley 1860) 11 Iowa 410; Loomis v. Stove
Ainsworth v. Bowen (1859) 9 is. 320.

(1874) 72 Ill. 623;

Sedgwich on Damages (9th ed.) § 492a.
9. Johnson v. Stear (1862) 15 C. B. (N. S.) 330, 33 L. J. C. P. 130; Halliday v.
Holgate (1868) L. R. 3 Ex. 299; Rosenzweig v. Frazer (1882) 82 Ind. 342; Work v. Ben8.

nett (1872) 70 Pa. St. 484; Baltimore Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple (1866) 25 Md. 269; Fisher
v.Brown (1870) 104 Mass. 259; Richardsonv.Ashby (1895) 132 Mo. 238, 30 S. W. 806.
10. Work v.Bennett (1872) 70 Pa. St. 484; Baltimore Ins. Co. v.Dalrymple (1866)

25 Md. 269; Fei e v.Burt (1898) 118 Mich. 243, 77 N. W. 928.
11. In Johnson v. Stear, supra, Erie, C. J.,says: "On these authorities we

hold that the damages due to the plaintiff for the wrongful conversion of the pledge
by the defendant, are to be measured by the loss he has really sustained; and that

in measuring these damages, the interest of the defendant in the pledge at the time
of the conversion is to be taken into the account. It follows that the amount is merely
nominal."
Also in an action for money had and received, when the pledged goods have been
sold, the measure of damages should be the amount of the debt. Belden v.Perkins
(1875) 78 Il1.449. Jones, Pledge and Collateral Security (2d ed.) 580.
12. 132 Mo. 238, 33 S.W. 806. See 9 Harvard Law Review 540.
13. 90 Mo. App. 111.
14. 24 L. R. A. (N. S.)511, note.
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if a tender were made, should be looked into. The language, at any
event, is contra to that of the supreme court in Richardson v. Ashby.
In the recent case of Union Cold Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Pitts5
a pledgee refused to sell to a purchaser presented by the pledgor. The
court held that this amounted to a conversion of the pledged property,
and cited Schaaf v. Fries. The act being a conversion, the pledgor could
properly counterclaim the conversion in an action on the note. There
was perhaps sufficient tender in presenting a purchaser ready and willing
to buy. If this is so the decision in this case is correct, even under the
doctrine of Schaaf v. Fries, which holds a tender necessary to support a
16
claim of conversion.
K. B.
METHOD OF OUSTING PUBLIC OFFICER WHO HAS FORFEITED OFFICE

THROUGH MISCONDUCT.-The constitution of Missouri' prohibits passes,
or tickets at a discount to members of the general assembly, the state
board of equalization or any state, county or municipal officer, and makes
the penalty for the acceptance of passes or tickets at a discount by such
officers a forfeiture of office. The question at once presents itself as to
whether or not this clause is self-executing-that is, as to whether,
by the mere acceptance of such pass or discounted ticket, the office of
the acceptor is automatically forfeited.
It is declared in an Arkansas case that "when the organic law is
silent as to the mode of declaring a forfeiture, the legislature possesses
the inherent power to prescribe the means to ascertain the same. "' The
constitution of Missouri is silent with regard to ouster from office, but
there is a statutory provision' as follows: "Any member of the general
assembly of the state of Missouri, or member of the state board of equalization of any state, judicial, county or municipal officer, who shall accept
use or travel on any free passes, . . . or tickets at a discount
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished by a fine of not
less than fifty dollars nor more than five hundred dollars for each offense,
and upon conviction thereof, forfeit his office, and if there be no provisions
made by law for the removal of such officer by impeachment, the court
trying the cause shall adjudge the defendant to have forfeited his office
and declare the same vacant; Provided, that no court other than the
circuit court or criminal court of record shall have power to adjudge any
such office to be forfeited and vacant."
After a conviction, then, what course of procedure may be followed
to remove the officer? In the case of Wells v. State,4 which arose under a
15. (1914) 161 S. W. 1182.
16. As to the question discussed by Farrtngton, J.,regarding the liability of a
pledgee for loss through his negligence, see 31 Cyc. 836, and authority cited in note 38.

1. Art. XII, § 24.

2.
3.
4.

See Revised Statutes 1909, p. 131.

State v. Hixon (1872) 27 Ark. 398, 402.
Revised Statutes 1909, § 4814.
(Ind., 1911) 94 N. E. 321.
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statute6 providing that on conviction of an officer of acts sufficient to
cause a forfeiture the court may oust such officer so convicted, the court
said: "It can hardly be supposed that the legislature intended the remedy
thus specifically provided to be concurrent with quo warranto.
The statute was enacted with the two-fold purpose of affording the accused
in all such cases the right of a speedy trial by jury, and of relieving the
courts invested with original jurisdiction in quo warranto of the trial of
that class of cases."
In fact it seems well established that the existence
of any other remedy will prevent quo warranto from lying.'
The questions discussed above have been raised in the recent case of
State ex rel. Letcher v. Dearing,' which is an action of prohibition. In
that case it appears that Letcher accepted a pass from the Missouri Pacific
Railroad. An information in the nature of quo warranto was filed against
him. Later a criminal information was also filed against him. The
quo warranto case was set for hearing June 16, 1913, and the criminal
case was continued until August, 1913.
Letcher brought a writ of prohibition against the respondent Dearing,
as judge of the Washington County Circuit Court to prevent the respondent from trying the relator upon the information in the nature of quo
warranto. Relator, Letcher, claims that he is entitled to a trial by jury
under Revised Statutes, 1909, section 4814,8 and that a trial of the quo
warranto proceeding in June may prevent his obtaining a trial by jury
in August.
The writ of prohibition was granted by the Supreme Court, Woodson and Brown, J. J., dissenting. The court says in part: "The constitution provides no method for the determination of the forfeiture.
An officer cannot be deprived of his office without some kind of a judicial
hearing, and the constitution provides no method for such hearing. The
constitutional provision is broad enough to be a foundation for a legislative act prescribing a method of determining a forfeiture, but is not so
far self-executing as to render legislation upon the question unnecessary. "
9
The court then notices Revised Statutes 1909, section 4814, and says:
" Here we have a clear statutory provision for a determination of the question of forfeiture. . . . It locates the jurisdiction to determine the
forfeiture in a court having jurisdiction over criminal cases and none
other. Not only so but it requires a conviction, before there can be a
The court then sets out the statutory provision
judgment of forfeiture."
10
with regard to removal by quo warranto of one who usurps an office,
5. Burn's Ann. St. 1908, § 1188.
6. High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, §§ 616, 618, 637, 643, 645; Malone v.
N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co. (N. Y., 1908) 83 N. E. 408; Gladish v. Lovewell (Ark., 1910)
130 S. W. 579; City of North Birmingham v. State (Ala., 1910) 52 So. 202.
(7). (1913) 162 5. W. 618.
8. Supra.

9. ra
10.
any person shall usurp, Intrude Into or unlawfully hold or execute
amy office or franchise, t o Attorney General of the state, or any circuit or prosecuting

attorney of the county in which the action is commenced, shall exhibit to the circuit
court, or other court having concurrent jurisdiction therewith in civil cases, an in-
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and proceeds as follows: "In a case like the one at bar it cannot be said
that relator has usurped, intruded into or unlawfully held his office,
until there has been a trial and judgment of forfeiture. It stands conceded
that he is rightfully in the office, unless he has forfeited that right by conduct subsequent to his induction into office.
The question then is:
Who shall try the matter of forfeiture, a court of equity, or the courts
named in the statute? If the constitutional provision i,;
not self-executing, as we have held, than it is clear that the forfeiture must be determined in the method pointed out by the statute. In other words, that
the judgment of forfeiture can only follow a conviction under the criminal
charge."
The position taken by the majority of the court seems entirely sound.
The constitution provides that a public officer who takes a free pass or
ticket at a discount shall forfeit his office, but says nothing about the enforcement of the forfeiture. It would seem, then, that the legislature was
quite justified in providing the procedure for enforcing the forfeiture,
and that that procedure and no other should be followed."
C. B. R. Jr.
MUST AN AFFIDAVIT BE SIGNED?-The case of Robertson v. Robertson'
has been certified by the Springfield Court of Appeals to the Supreme
Court,2 because Robertson, P. J., deemed the decision in conflict with
two previous cases. The question involved is whether the absence of
the affiant's signature to an affidavit supporting a divorce petition was
fatal to the original court's jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals held that
it was fatal. The decision at first glance seems insupportable in light
both of the reluctance courts have to setting aside divorce proceedings
under any circumstances, and especially in light of the fact that in this
case two years had elapsed since the granting of the divorce.
The field for the use of affidavits is so extensive that it would be hazardous to lay down an inflexible rule to be applied in every case. The
practice of requiring the deponent's signature arose in Chancery in 1661,
founded on an order issued by the Chancellor.'
Obviously this facilitates
identification; and the statements contained in the affidavit being under
oath, and before an officer of the court, a prosecution for perjury may be
based upon it.
However, an affidavit may be identified without an
appending signature, and if false it may still support a prosecution for
formation In the nature of quo warranto, at the relation of any person desiring to prosecute the same; and when such information has been filled and proceedings have ben
commenced, the same shall not be dismissed or discontinued without the consent of
the person named therein as the relator; but such relator shall have the right to prosecute the same to final judgment, either by himself or by attorney."
Revised Statutes
1909, § 2631.
11. See in accord with the principal case State v. Wilson (1883) 30 Kan. 673,
2 Pac. 828.

1.

2.
see Vol.
3.
1 Newl.

(1914) 163 S. W. 266.
Under the authority of section 6 of the constitutional amendment of 1884,
1, p. 101, Revised Statutes 1909.
Beam's Orders, 210; 2 Har. Pr. 2; Wyatt's Pr. Reg. 8; 1 Grant's Pr. 240;
Pr. 237.
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4
Answering its function, then, without a signature, the overperjury.
whelming majority of courts have held that, while a signature may be
a formal requisite, in the absence of statute or positive rule of court its
6
omission does not invalidate an affidavit.
However, the peculiar facts of Robertson v. Robertson, demand careful consideration. When the decree for divorce was applied for, the present plaintiff was a non-resident of the state. Service was had upon him
by publication, which was never brought to his notice until the case had
been disposed of. Since such a proceeding partakes of an ex parte character, it is reasonable that the petitioner stand before the court "in the most
satisfactory way known to our system of jurisprudence," as is said by the
court in the principal case.'
Not only must he verify the facts, which
the statute requires to be set forth in the affidavit, but he must solemnly
swear to them. And it is indisputable that a signature helps to accomplish the statutory purpose. It is further to be noted in this case that
in the two years intervening, there had been no remarriage, so that certain serious considerations, which might have had weight if there had
been a remarriage, were not here before the court. Had it been necessary
to declare children illegitimate, and upset property rights acquired in
good faith under the former decree, such considerations might well have
influenced the decision.
It will be interesting to note the disposition of the case by the Supreme
Court.
That court may dispose of the case on its special facts, or may
adjudicate the general question, whether a writing under oath before an
authorized officer, without a signature, is an affidavit, since the supporting
7
paper to a divorce petition is labelled by our statute merely an affidavit.
Our courts have undoubtedly held that a signature is a substantial
element of an affidavit. The precise point has been squarely before three
of our higher courts, and all disposed of it in the same way. The earliest
decision is that of the Supreme Court in the case of Hargadine v. Van
Horn.8 Plaintiff, in an ejectment suit, relied upon title obtained at an
attachment sale. The affidavit in the proceeding was not signed. "In
the present case," said the court, speaking through Napton, J., "there
was no affidavit at all, that is, the paper described and referred to by the
clerk as the one upon which the writ of attachment issued, was not signed
by anyone, and was therefore no affidavit. "0 The next case, Norman v.
Horn,'o which came up before the St. Louis Court of Appeals, was a case
of conversion, based upon an attachment, supported by an affidavit,
signed by the defendant in the partnership name of his firm. The court

4. Bates v. Robinson (1859) 8 Iowa 318; Commonwealth v. Carel (1870) 105
Mass. 582.
5. See Fletcher's Equity Pleading & Practice 464, for collection of cases on

this point; 2 Cyc. 26, and cases cited.
6. Page 270.
7. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2371.
8. (1880) 72 Mo. 370.
9. Sherwood, J., dissented, contending that the absence of the signature made
the oath merely defective, and it could not be attacked in a collateral proceeding.
10. (1889) 36 Mo. App. 419, 424.
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said: "The affidavit cannot be regarded as the oath of the individual
members of the firm, or of either of them, because the affidavit is not
signed by them."
In both of these cases, the writing was held void in
a collateral proceeding. It is not surprising then, that the same result
was reached in an original proceeding in the case of The Third National
Bank of Sedalia v. Garton."
Richardson v. Richardson seems to be in harmony with the cases
just discussed. Nor do the cases, which Robertson, P. J., deems inconsistent with the decision in the principal case, really seem to be in conflict with it.
In both Barhyst & Co. v. Alexander & Co.," and State v. Headrick,13
the question of the sufficiency of an affidavit without a signature was
not under consideration. The courts, incidentally and very generally
defining an affidavit, omit a signature as an element. However the
dissent of Robertson, P. J., is not without force. It is properly directed
toward the sufficiency of the statutory divorce affidavit. The decided
cases have dealt with affidavits in attachments and foreclosure proceedings,
and in the various steps of ordinary legal proceedings. Divorce proceedings. stand in a class by themselves. These proceedings affect so vitally
the status of individuals as well as important classes of rights, that a
decree, once granted, should, whenever possible, be considered once and
for all closed. At least, no trivial technicality should be a ground for
setting it aside. In the words of Robertson, P. J. 4, "I do not believe
there should be a rule of law established that necessitates children being
declared illegitimate, that requires the readjustment of property rights,
or that permits perjurers to escape simply because a name is not subscribed to an oath which is reduced to writing and otherwise authenticated
so as to leave no doubt as to what facts are sworn to and as to who made
the affidavit."
Though the decision in the principal case is in accord
with previous adjudications of the subject in Missouri, it should
be borne in mind that the great weight of authority is contra, the position
of the majority being supported on the ground that the real purpose of a
signature to an affidavit is to make more conclusive the identification of
the affiant. The argument that the original divorce proceedings were
really ex parle, and that the petitioner should, therefore, establish his
case in the most solemn and conclusive manner, is perhaps met by the
consideration that a divorce decree once granted should not be set aside
except for very good reasons.
R. BURNETT.
THE

HUSBAND'S

LIABILITY

FOR

NECESSARIES

SUPPLIED

TO

THE

WIFE.-It is a well-established rule of common law that the husband

11.

(1890) 40 Mo. App. 133 Smi'th, P. J., dissented, holding that under our

liberal amending provision, the application for amendment should have been allowed.
See Revised Statutes 1909, § 1848.
12. (1894) 59 Mo. App. 188, 192.
13. (1899) 149 Mo. 396, 403.
14.
obertson v. Robertson (1014) 163 S. W. 266. 270.
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Where he
is bound to furnish necessaries for the support of his wife.
to pledge his
authority
to
have
wife
is
said
duty
the
this
fails to perform
2
credit for necessaries suitable to her situation and his condition in life.
an
the
law
creates
circumstances
such
that
under
It is frequently stated
8
This theory sufficiently explains
irrevocable agency based upon status.
is liable for the necessaries
the
husband
hold
that
cases
which
the class of
purchased by his wife when he has given the dealer express orders not to
4
It is also applicable to the case where the husband
furnish them to her.
is compelled to pay the reasonable legal expenses of his wife in defense
5
of a prosecution instituted by himself; and, the so-called agency being
irrevocable, the liability of a husband who becomes insane for necessaries
8
bought by his wife may be explained in terms of the doctrine of agency
stated above,
However, difficulty in explaining the husband's absolute liability
in terms of agency begins to arise when we get cases where the husband
is an infant, and could, therefore, only make voidable contracts. Granted
that the agency of the wife is irrevocable, still that does not explain the
infant husband's unavoidable liability to one who furnishes her with
And yet such a husband has been held liable both in Engnecessaries.
8
land,' and in this country.
We are confronted with another difficulty when we attempt to apply
the doctrine to such cases as Wray v. Coxe,9 where the necessaries were
furnished the wife while she was an inmate of an asylum, or to the case
where the wife was unconscious at the time the necessaries were furnished.
If this is agency it is agency without a conscious agent-an absolute
anomaly. Under the common law it is the duty of the husband to give a
10
One who performs
suitable burial to the body of his deceased wife.
the husband's failure
or
upon
of
the
husband,
this duty in the absence
to perform it can recover from him the expenses incurred thereby," and
the courts assert that this liability is similar to the obligation of the hus2
It is clearly impossible
band to supply his wife with necessaries in life.
logically to apply any doctrine of agency to such cases, for, as was stated

347.

1.

Miontague v. Benedict (1825) 3 B & C. 635; Rutherford v. Coze (1848) 11 Mo.

2. Montague v. Benedict (1825) 3 B. & C. 635; Ross v. Ross (1873) 69 Il. 569;
Pierpont v. Wilson (1881) 49 Conn. 450; Cromwell v. Benjamin (N. Y., 1863) 41 Barb.

558; Sauter v. Scrutchfield (1887) 28 Mo. App. 150; French v. Burlingame (1911) 155
Mo. App. 548, 134 S. W. 1100.
3. Easland v. Burchell (1878) 3 Q. B. D. 432; Johnson v. Sumner (1858) 3 H. &
N. 261; Barker v. Carter (1890) 83 Me. 132, 21 AtI. 834; Sautet v. Scrutchfield (1887)
28 Mo. App. 150; Rutherford v. Coxe (1848) 11 Mo. 347.
4. McGrath v. Donnelly (1889) 131 Pa. 549, 20 Atl. 387; Cromwell v. Benjaminh
(N. Y., 1863) 41 Barb. 558.
5. Warner v. Heides (1871) 28 Wis. 518.
6.

Read v. Legard (1851) 6 Exch. 636; Thedford v. Reade (1898) 54 N. Y. Supp.

7.
8.
9.

Turnerv. Trisby (1792) 1 Str. 168.

1007.

Cole v. Seeley (1853) 25 Vt. 220.
(1854) 24 Ala. 337.
10. Jenkins v. Tucker (1788) 1 H. B1. 90.
11. Bradshaw v. Beard (1862) 12 C. B. (N. 8.) 344; Gleason v. Warner (1899)

78 Minn. 405, 81 N. W. 206; Seyhold v. Morgan (1891) 43 111. App. 39.
12. Cunningham v. Reardon (1868) 98 Mass. 538; Gleason v. Warner (1899)

78 Minn. 405, 81 N. W. 206.
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in Sauter v. Scrutchfield,3 "It would present the singular aspect of an
agency without an agent."
But the most significant element of these recoveries is that the amount
recovered is the reasonable value of the services rendered, or necessaries
furnished. 14 This illustrates another difficulty of establishing such a
liability on the theory of agency, and exemplifies one of the chief characteristics of quasi-contractual obligations, which is that the plaintiff shall
be compensated only for the benefit which he has conferred upon the defendant.
Since there are so many serious objections to this so-called theory
of agency, one is not surprised to find that a few jurisdictions have indicated a tendency to disregard it, and to adopt a doctrine far more reasonable and consistent."5 They treat the liability as, "an original and
direct liability in the husband created by marriage,'" and regard the
real basis of the obligation as the quasi-contractual doctrine of dutiful
intervention. 7 Broadly speaking, this means the performance of another's legal obligation by an appropriate person under peculiar circumstances which justify or require his intervention. To this doctrine as
applied to the cases in hand there seems to be no serious objection, for
if we apply it to the cases discussed above which proved difficult to explain on the agency theory, we encounter no difficulties. And, in addition to that fact, we find that it applies more satisfactorily to the cases
which could be worked out on the basis of agency. Furthermore it is
perfectly consistent with a recovery for the reasonable value, which is
universally allowed.
In the recent case of Moran v. Montz,1 8 decided by the Kansas City
Court of Appeals, it appears that the plaintiff had been employed under
a written contract by Joseph Montz to defend certain criminal cases
against him and his wife. During this employment and while Joseph
Montz was in jail, his wife Mary Montz became violently insane.
The
plaintiff was informed of her insanity. He went to the police station and
took charge of her, and had her committed to an asylum. Later, when
her condition became better, the plaintiff got her released on parole.
Plaintiff brought action against Joseph Montz and his wife to recover
$200 for the above described services, but expressly asserted that he did
not base his claim on the written contract of employment. The court
said in part: "Montz did not know of these services nor of the necessity
for them, until after they had been performed, and Mrs. Montz, being
insane, was incapable of becoming a party to an express contract. But
it does not follow that the plaintiff should be turned away empty-handed
13.

(1887) 28 Mo. App. 150.

14.
15.

See cases cited above, and Woodward, The Law of Quasi Contracts, § 203.
Black v. Bryan (1857) 18 Tex. 467; Woodward v. Barnes (1871) 43 Vt. 330;

Bergh v. Warner (1891) 47 Minn. 250, 20 N, W. 77; Rea v. Durkee (1861) 25 Inl. 414.
16. Sauter v. Scrutchfield (1887) 28 Mo. App. 150, 157.
17. Woodward, The Law of Quasi-Contracts, § 203; Huffcutt on Agency, § 55.
18. (1914) 162 S. W. 323.
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as a mere volunteer, or as an intermeddler in the affairs of another."
The court then pointed out that Montz was in prison where he could not
care for his wife who needed immediate legal services to procure for her
the necessary medical attention, and referred to Gabriel v. Mullen" which
held that medical services for a sick wife are necessaries which a husband
is bound to provide. The court concluded as follows: "The law will
imply a contract on the part of the husband to pay the reasonable value
of necessary medical attention voluntarily bestowed upon his wife under
exigent circumstances, and we think that legal services which are indispensable to securing the admittance of an insane women to an asylum for
the insane, and for the performance of which there is an immediate and
Mrs.
most exigent necessity, should also be classed as necessaries."
Montz was held not liable.
It is clear from the language quoted above that the court conceived
of the husband's liability as being entirely quasi-contractual. Under
the particular circumstances of this case the defendant received a benefit,
the retention of which would have unjustly enriched him. "This may be
a negative enrichment but it is the tendency of the courts to permit a
recovery for negative enrichment in quasi-contract. "20 Prompt performance of defendant's duty of care for his wife was of public concern,
and since performance by the defendant was impossible we have only to
decide whether the plaintiff was an appropriate person to intervene. If
so, which was not questioned in this case, then the defendant is obligated
to reimburse him to the extent of the reasonable value of the services
performed. The conclusion reached in this case is reasonable and consistent, and consititutes a proper application to the facts here involved
of the law which regards the basis of the liability as the quasi-contractual
doctrine of dutiful intervention earlier discussed.
R. BURNS.
SUBROGATION.-" Subrogation is the substitution of one person in
place of another, whether as creditor or as possessor of any other rightful
claim, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the right of the other in
relation to the debt or claim and its rights, remedies or securities. "I Three
2
classes of persons are said to be entitled to subrogation: (1) Those who
Those
act in performance of a duty arising by agreement or law. (2)
(3) Those who act at the request of a debtor
who act for self-protection.
directly or indirectly, or upon invitation of the public, and where payments are favored by public policy. In the Missouri case of Capen v.
19.

20.
1.

(1892) 111 Mo. 119, 19 S. W. 1099.

McSorley v. Faulkner (1892) 18 N. Y. Supp. 460.
Jackson v. Boylston Ins. Co. (1885) 139 Mass. 508, 2 N. E. 103.

See also

Aetna Ins. Co. v. Middleport (1888) 124 U. S. 534; Evenson v. Halleck (1900) 108 Wis.
249, 83 N. W. 1102.
2. 6 Pomeroy's Equity, §§ 921 et seq.
See also Evans v. Halleck (1884) 83 Mo.
(1909) 193 Mo. 335, 92 S. W. 368.
3.

376; Norton v. Highleyman (1886) 88 Mo. 621; Bunn v. Lindsay (1888) 95 Mo. 250,
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3
Garrison it is said that "subrogation is usually applied where a person
at the request of the debtor pays the mortgage debt, or where one interested in property pays an encumbrance to protect his own interest, or
where he stands in the relation of surety for the debt."
The doctrine of subrogation, as borrowed from the civil law, was
decidedly limited in its scope, but it "has been steadily expanding and
growing in importance and extent in its application to various subjects
and classes of persons. "I Every doctrine of law or equity must, of course,
have its limitations, and in fixing the limits for the application of the doc5
In a gentrine of subrogation the courts have laid down varying rules.
eral way it may be said that the doctrine of subrogation will not be invoked where inherent justice does not concur with some well-established
principle of equity jurisprudence, or where the party seeking it is a mere
volunteer.'
The Missouri cases have in the past confined the application of this
equitable doctrine within rather narrow limits, as will be seen by a brief
chronological consideration of them. In Wooldredge v. Scott' it was held
that a creditor of an estate who discharged a vendor's lien at the request
of the vendee was not entitled to the benefits of the doctrine of subrogation. In Price v. Courtney' there was a devise of all the testator's property
in trust for minor children to a trustee with full power and control. Under the mistaken belief that he had power to encumber the land the trustee
executed a mortgage on part of it and claimed to have used some of the
money for payment of taxes. The court, in declaring the mortgage void,
said that, even had the money been loaned for the specific purpose of
removing a tax lien, such application would have created no equity of
subrogation in favor of the one who loaned the money. The court, in
Norton v. Highleyman, refused relief by subrogation to one who paid a
mortgage under a mistake of law, holding that subrogation is limited
in its application to cases where one pays a debt at the debtor's request
5
or to protect some interest of his own. Bunn v. Lindsay" was a case in
which it was held that the demand of a creditor, which is paid with the
*money of a third person without an agreement for subrogation, is extinguished, but will be revived in favor of one who has been compelled to
pay it in order to protect his own rights. In Kleinman v. Gieselmann"

4. Home Savings Bank v. Bierstadt (1897) 168 Il. 618, 48 N. E. 161.
In Arnold v. Green (1889) 116 N. Y. 566, 23 N. E. 1, it Is said: "The remedy of

subrogation is no longer limited to sureties and quasi-sureties but includes so wide a
range of subjects that it has been called the mode which equity adopts to compel the
ultimate jVayment of a debt by one who in justice, equity and good conscience ought
to pay it. ' See also Crippen v. Chppel (1886) 35 Kan. 495. 11 Pac. 453; Emmet v.
Thompson (1892) 49 Minn. 386, 52 N. W. 31; Meeker v. Larson (1902) 65 Neb. 158, 90
N. W. 958.
5. 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 838.
6. Meeker v. Larson (1902) 65 Neb. 158, 90 N. W. 958; Rachel v. Smith (1900)
101 Fed. 159. See also cases cited in note 4, supra.
7. (1879) 69 Mo. 669.
8. (1885) 87 Mo. 387, 56 Am. Rep. 453.
9. (1886) 88 Mo. 62.
10. (1888) 95 Mo. 258, 7 S. W. 473.
11. (1892) 114 Mo. 444, 21 S. W. 800.
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it was held that one who paid an encumbrance on land and took a mortgage on it from one whom he believed had authority to encumber it, but
who in fact did not, was not entitled to subrogation. In Capen v. Garrison 2 the court declared that one who advances money to pay an encumbrance on a ward's property upon security of a deed of trust executed
by the curator with the sanction of the probate court, which proves to be
without justification of law, is not, in case the old encumbrance is cancalled from the record, entitled to be subrogated to the benefits of it.
3
In the recent Missouri case of Berry v. Stigall the doctrine of subrogation was extended beyond the limits set by the cases cited above. In
that case a testator devised to his wife full power and control over all his
realty until his youngest child should become of legal age, so that she
might support and maintain the children from the rents and profits. The
wife died during the minority of the children and another person was
appointed trustee. Before his death the testator had executed a note,
and, as security, a deed of trust upon this land. Upon this note falling
due the trustee, in order to save the land, gave his own note as such and
attempted to execute a mortgage on the property. In this action by the
cestui que trustent to have the mortgage executed by the trustee declared
void, it was held, with Bond, Graves, and Faris, JJ., dissenting, that, the
proceeds of the loan having been used to discharge a valid obligation, the
present mortgagee, not being a volunteer, was subrogated to the rights
of the original mortgagee.
The decision was put on the ground that equity seeks to prevent
the unearned enrichment of one at the expense of another, Brown, C.,
saying that the right to subrogation exists in all cases where payment is
favored by public policy, and that, just as a purchaser at a void judicial
sale is protected, so those having charge of the interests of minors should
be protected in their efforts to protect their estate. There was also e
suggestion in the concurring opinion of Woodson, J., that the trustee irt
this case had authority to encumber the land, but this point is fully answered by Bond, J., in his dissenting opinion.
That the court was influenced in its decision by the hardship which
cancellation of the mortgage would have involved is evidenced by Brown,
J.'s, statement in his concurring opinion that "the judgment nisi [for
defendant] is so clearly for the wrong party that I would vote to reverse
it though it were supported by every case adjudicated since the days of
However, there is much to be said for the decision on its
Justinian."
merits. The objection that the original mortgage has been removed
from the record and extinguished, and that the parties had no intention
of keeping it alive, should not prove a very formidable barrier to a court
of equity in applying a doctrine which is "a creation of equity for the
And as for the objection that a perfurtherance of substantial justice."
son paying money under a mistake of law is not entitled to equitable re12.

(1909) 193 Mlo. 335, 92 S. W. 368, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 838.
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lief, it may be said that there is very respectable authority, which, for
purposes of a case like this, makes no distinction between mistake of law
and mistake of fact. 4 The able dissenting opinion of Bond, J., is such as
to cast considerable doubt upon the rule laid down, but in the light of the
modern tendency to widen the scope of application of subrogation, as
has been shown," it is not easy to say that the court went too far in allowing subrogation in this case.
E. L. W.
13.f (1913) 162 S. W. 126.
r
14. , 24 Harvard Law Review 161, and cases there cited.
15. See notes 4, 5, and 6 supra.

